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Peace breaks out in Europe

6/30/2012

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The chief concrete change that came out of the summit is the one I reported would most likely happen (over a month ago). The ESM can now directly recapitalize banks.  This  “surprise” good news announcement buoyed markets yesterday.  
  
The BBC identifies the challenges that lie ahead:
“The agreement appears to be a concession by Germany, which has  insisted on strict limits for Eurozone lending. The Maastricht Treaty which  launched the euro does not allow governments to be bailed out directly with EU  taxpayers' money - yet that is where the rescue funds' money comes  from.
 …..

Some elements of a fiscal union are so fundamental that they would require treaty changes and at the very least referendums in some  countries. All of that could easily take 10 years.”

We will see what German opposition (previously in favour of  faster integration) thinks of this now that reality is getting closer. The  Eurozone does not have 10 years to get this right. They might have 1 year if  they can show evidence of progress. 

My scepticism that there will be a failure to rescue the Euro remains unchanged. I think this current honeymoon lasts unlit the quarterly GDP numbers start rolling in.

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The Dynamics of the rise of shadow banking in China and their credit bubble

6/1/2012

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Quotes Hugh Hendry.
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I am starting to lose respect for "The Economist" magazine

5/31/2012

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The Economist has hit the trifecta of stupid on its last three covers. I am starting to wonder if their writers are some Ayn Randish - Stepford Wives type clones. At very least the magazine seems to be turning into a corporate whore.

Think I am exaggerating?
Their cover for their print edition, May 12-18th, shows a picture of Achilles voting with the caption Europe's Achille's heel.

"If a majority of Greeks again vote to reject the spending cuts and reforms that go with their country’s bail-out, then euro-zone governments—in particular,  Germany’s—will face a drastic choice. Mrs Merkel will either accommodate Greece and swallow the moral hazard of rewarding defiance or, more likely, stand firm and cut the Greeks adrift."

The problem is not democracy or that European voters are rejecting austerity. At some point if you are going to anally rape me I am going to figure it out and resist. I may be asleep when the rape starts, but given your actions, unless you club me unconscious, I am going to wake up. The problem is that the austerity adjustment mechanisms will require sustained high
unemployment and will destroy the wealth of the middle class.

To quote Pettis on Spanish adjustment:
 
How  will we deal with the rising debt burden?  Typically we do so by confiscating  the wealth of small and medium enterprises or by confiscating the savings of the middle classes, and usually we do both. 

I am pretty sure that the middle class taxpayer in the European  periphery knows who's benefit the austerity measures are for - Germany's. 

With respect to their latest cover on China. How strong is China’s economy?

"Until recently most economists believed that China was heavily dependent on exports. But it has carried on growing even as its current-account surplus has  shrunk, and trade has subtracted from growth, not added to it. The country is undoubtedly investment-dependent, but its biggest problem is malinvestment not overinvestment. Most people believe that its past malinvestment will impede  future growth. This special report has raised doubts about that. Clearly China  would be better off had it not wasted so much capital. But if the capital stock  is not as good as it should be, that gives the country all the more room for  improvement.

Wrong on sooo many levels. Yeah, when you "invest" in millions of units of housing that are empty then this is both a misallocation of capital and an overinvestment of capital. You have lit money on fire. This money is gone forever. Also, "The Economist" provides no hope or insight as to why a flawed investment process (driven by corrupt SOEs) will do better the next time around.

Here is Jim Chanos on China's debt

Then their cover showing public companies as an endangered species. Woolly mammoths with brands like Facebook going over a cliff.

 They begin the article:
"The number of public companies has fallen dramatically over the past decade—by  38% in America since 1997 and 48% in Britain. The number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in America has declined from an average of 311 a year in
1980-2000 to 99 a year in 2001-11. Small companies, those with annual sales of less than $50m before their IPOs—have been hardest hit. In 1980-2000 an average  of 165 small companies undertook IPOs in America each year. In 2001-09 that
number fell to 30. Facebook will probably give the IPO market a temporary boost—several other companies are queuing up to follow its lead—but they will do  little to offset the long-term decline."

So they pick, as the reference point, the 20 years of one of the  biggest bull markets in history (that contains the dot com bubble) and compare it with a bear market that contains the popping of the dot com bubble, the fraud scandals like Enron, and the Great Recession. Wow, are you intellectually dishonest.

They end the article with a free market bromide:
"Public companies built the railroads of the 19th century. They filled the world  with cars and televisions and computers. They brought transparency to business life and opportunities to small investors. Because public companies sell shares to the unsophisticated, policymakers are right to regulate them more tightly than other forms of corporate organisation. But not so tightly that entrepreneurs start to dread the prospect of a public listing. The public company has long been the locomotive of capitalism. Governments should not derail it."

With the way the Facebook IPO was handled does “The Economist” still think the problem with IPO’s is too much regulation?

I am sorry,  but this magazine is turning into FOX News.




 
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JP Morgan

5/11/2012

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Jamie Dimon beat his chest about how well JP Morgan navigated the subprime crisis and how they didn’t need TARP. He has consistently argued against regulating the OTC derivative market and financial regulations more generally. Today he announced a $2 Billion trading loss that “might” grow to $3  Billion next month. Lacking shame, he refuses to resign, lacking balls, the board
refuses to fire him.  

I  think I just threw up in my mouth.
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Amen Brother Hussman

4/16/2012

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From Hussman April 9
"In my view, individuals like Sheila  Bair - the former head of the FDIC, Paul  Volcker - the former Fed Chairman, and Elizabeth  Warren - the former head of the  Congressional oversight panel for TARP,  demonstrated leadership in  elevating the interests of the public over  the interests of bank bondholders,  reckless lenders, and entrenched interests.  Unfortunately, all of their voices
were stifled during the credit crisis -  though hopefully some provisions of the Volcker Rule will survive, particularly  those related to bank restructuring. We would be far along the road to economic  recovery had we dealt with our crisis the way Sweden durably dealt with its own  in the early 1990's (essentially taking a large portion of the banking industry  into receivership, wiping out existing shareholders, writing down bad assets,  and then taking the banks public to recapitalize them under new owners).  Bernanke, in contrast, has been at the forefront of the kick-the-can strategy of  bailouts, accounting changes, customizable stress tests, and helicopter money. "
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Thursday’s With Mishkin Part 1-Market Design

3/31/2012

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Thursday’s With Mishkin Part 1

Recently, former Fed Governor Fredric Mishkin, one of the Economists interviewed in ‘Inside Job’, came to give a talk at the University of Calgary. I had the opportunity to speak with him privately for fifteen minutes before his lecture and found him energetic and engaging. His talk comes out of two papers he has written since the start of the Great Recession.

Mishkin cites nine basic principles of monetary policy that he believes remain valid after the crisis:

1. Inflation is Always and  Everywhere a Monetary Phenomenon
2. Price Stability Has Important Benefits.
3. There is No Long-Run  Tradeoff Between Unemployment and Inflation.
4. Expectations Play a Crucial Role in the Macro Economy.
5. The Taylor Principle is Necessary for Price Stability.
6. The Time-Inconsistency  Problem is Relevant to Monetary Policy.
7. Central Bank Independence Improves Macroeconomic Performance.
8. Credible Commitment to a Nominal Anchor Promotes Price and Output Stability.
9. Financial Frictions Play and Important Role in the Business Cycle.

 “None of the lessons from the financial crisis in any way undermines or invalidates the nine basic principles of the science of monetary  policy developed before the crisis.”

Where then did the Fed go wrong? He offers five lessons learned.
1. Developments in the financial sector have a far greater impact on economic activity than we earlier realized.
2. The macro economy is highly nonlinear.
3. The zero lower bound is more problematic than we realized.
4. The cost of cleaning up after financial crises is very high.
5.  Price and output stability do not ensure financial stability.

Lesson 1
 Developments in the financial sector have a far greater impact on economic activity than we earlier realized.

 “The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 therefore demonstrated that financial frictions should be front and center in macroeconomic analysis: they no longer could be ignored in the macro-econometric that models that central banks use for forecasting and policy analysis, as we saw was the case  before the crisis. As a result, there is a resurgence of interest in the
interaction of finance and macroeconomics.”

Too bad the OTC market remains unregulated and the money center banks are even too bigger to fail than before the crisis. Mishkin did take a shot at Jamie Dimon for claiming the size of JP Morgan Chase put them at a competitive disadvantage.

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A (small) step in the right direct in the market design of financial instituitions

2/5/2012

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Banks must be allowed to fail in an orderly fashion. According to Simon Johnson in the NY Times, the Dodd-Frank bill has taken this is the right direction - but is still unlikely to apply to the biggest banks. The FDIC will be in charge of the clean up. 
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Financial Crisis 2008, The Wire, Market Design, Why Change is so difficult

1/18/2012

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The  award – winning HBO television series ‘The Wire’ opens with a bleak view of an inner city neighborhood. At first glance a viewer might be mistaken in thinking the location is war torn Sarajevo; however it is soon revealed to be drug infested, dilapidated west Baltimore. Detective, James McNulty, interviews a youth about a shooting homicide. The witness confides that the victim,  player at the weekly dice game, would regularly attempt to abscond with mone being wagered. When the detective asks why the victim was allowed to continue his participation despite continual attempts to rob the game, the witness responds “Got to. This (is) America, man.”  This scene is a metaphor for one of the program’s recurring themes – that despite repeated examples of rampant abuses and systematic gaming, institutions seem resistant to meaningful change.  

“The  Wire” is a poignant meditation on “the game” of life and how the rules of the game influence behavior in institutions. It dramatizes the manner in which weaknesses in market design, individuals chasing statistics for personal gain, and game playing within institutions often lead to tragedy and a tremendous waste of resources. The evolution of the global financial crisis is replete with examples of individuals and corporations gaming the financial regulator framework.

A  housing bubble is fueled by short term interest rates that are kept too low for too long in the wake of September 11, 2001. US consumers through home equity refinancing begin to use their homes as ATMs.  Individuals game the system by taking out loans they can not afford.

As the housing boom matures and most good quality borrowers have either bought or refinanced, the market looks for ways to keep the housing boom going. Credit standards weaken.  At a retail  level, mortgage originators fail to verify income. Since mortgage originators do  not keep mortgages on their books but instead sell them to financial institutions they are able to game the system by not having proper lending standards. 

At  the wholesale level, financial institutions buy mortgages from originators and  in turn repackage them as derivatives, mortgage back securities (MBS), and  resell the mortgages in pieces. Rating agencies fail to properly rate MBS products because they depend on the revenue of the financial institutions that issue them. In retrospect, it is not surprising that a MBS issue comprised of  80% subprime mortgages was given the highest possible investment grade rating. Investment banks game the system by shopping for ratings and selling paper that they know is substandard. 

In order to curry favor with Wall Street and voters, Congress and the Federal Reserve promote homeownership and financial innovation at the expense of Financial system stability. Financial institutions successfully lobby to have leverage restrictions relaxed -allowing them to shift from 10-12 times leverage to 30 to 40 times leverage. Products such as subprime mortgages and adjustable rate mortgages allow weaker borrowers to access the mortgage market. Quasi government entities, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, become some of the largest holders of MBS portfolios. Credit levels in the private US economy balloon to a multiple of 2.5 times average levels. 

The over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market, with hundreds of billions of dollars of notional exposure, is left completely unregulated and opaque. AIG, the world’s largest insurance company, is allowed to sell tens of billions of dollars of OTC derivatives and credit defaults swaps (CDS) –insurance on MBS, without being required to allocate any capital as a reserve. The individuals within AIG game the system by selling insurance products whose claims they can not pay.

Then, in the fall of 2008, in the space of a few weeks, the entire global financial system unravels. A system wide bailout, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), is implemented. Financial institutions and individuals that took enormous risk, issued “toxic waste” products, and profited from gaming the system in good times, are now allowed to socialize their losses.
  
 In response to the crisis Congress passed the Frank-Dodd financial reform bill that is seen by many market observers and participants as not being a substantive modification of the regulatory framework.  David  Einhorn, president of Greenlight Capital, a hedge fund with $7 billion dollars in assets under management, recently talked about the reforms on Charlie Rose.
He characterized the measures as Washington letting Wall Street off the hook with the understanding that Wall Street would let Washingtonoff the hook. “And so I think that the reform -- it doesn’t go after any of the obvious issues  that were identified in the crisis.” Among other changes, Einhorn believes credit rating agencies should  be abolished and reserve capital requirements need to be imposed on CDS.  

The lack of regulation of OTC derivatives market is a case of “déjà vu  all over again”. In the mid nineties, Brooksley Born, a Clinton appointee to chair the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, attempted to regulate the opaque market. The financial sector lobbied strongly against regulation. Robert Rubin the Secretar of Treasury, Arthur Levitt chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers, and Alan Greenspan chairman of the Federal Reserve, went to congress and successfully lobbied to remove her statutory ability to regulate the market. Shortly thereafter Born resigned her post. Even after the financial crisis, provoked by Long term Capital Management  in 1999, the OTC market was left unregulated. 
 
The Brooksley Born saga is reminiscent of a scene in “The Wire” where police  officers gather on both ends of a desk and attempt to move it through a door. They struggle mightily to no avail finally giving up - convinced that the desk just doesn’t fit. A moment later it becomes evident that they had been trying to push the desk in opposite directions. Born’s experience is representative of another major theme of “The Wire”. Institutional champions trying to affect  meaningful change often find themselves thwarted by those who benefit from  maintaining the status quo.     

The  recent global financial crisis is an example of life imitating art. The lack o fappropriate OTC regulatory response, despite two financial crises in the space of a decade, places us in the shoes of The Wire’s Detective McNulty. We are left to ask “why do we let the financial institutions play the same game, an unregulated OTC market, if it repeatedly leads to financial crises?” 
 
Several  lessons emerge. Markets are not self regulating. If the “market” is not correctly designed, individual and institutional optimization will be to the detriment and even collapse of the system as a whole. Absent proper changes to market design, market failures will follow a predicable repeating pattern. 
 
The  regulatory response to the financial crisis transferred a lot of private debt to  public balance sheets. It has sown the seed for the most likely next global crisis – sovereign debt. Furthermore, absent meaningful reform, it is only a matter of time before we will have another crisis sparked by the opaque unregulated OTC derivatives market. 

It  was not by accident that the Canadian financial system weathered the global financial crisis better than almost any other developed nation. Canadian  consumers or bankers are not intrinsically more ethical or risk adverse than their American counterparts. Also, one need only look to the case of  Icelandto see that being a small  country does not guarantee that markets will be more appropriately designed and  regulations more easily implemented. We were spared not by intrinsically superior virtues, but rather by the markets we designed and manner in which we regulated them.

In  the words of Omar, one of ‘The Wire’s’ most memorable characters: “I'll do what I can to help y'all. But, the game's out there, and it's play or get played. That simple.” 



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The nuclear solution to the housing problem Externalities, Moral Hazard, and System Design

1/4/2012

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A recent 60 minutes segment highlighted the peculiar situation in  Cleveland where perfectly good homes have been abandoned and are being bulldozed by the county. To preserve and protect its tax base the county has begun to bulldoze these abandoned homes. One in four mortgages in America are under water. Most are what they call “non recourse” loans where people can hand over the keys to the bank without being liable. Foreclosures rates have hit record levels due to the high rates of unemployment and depressed property values.
 
The Banks are foreclosing and evicting tenants, but to avoid paying the property tax and maintenance costs of the properties the banks are not taking possession of the properties after they have the owners evicted. As a result these homes often become targets for looters, get stripped down and become dilapidated. Abandoned homes thus become blight to their neighborhoods a  negative externality in the parlance of economics. The consequences and benefits (in this case negative) of a transaction between a homeowner and a bank have spillover effects to people who have nothing to do with the transaction.
 
By aggressively evicting tenants and foreclosing, the banks are actually depressing real estate of people who are not their customers. A county official suggested that it might be in the banks interest to lay off evictions so as to not further drive down real estate prices. The movie Margin Call shows why it may be in the competitive interest (Game theory maybe a Nash Equilibrium) to try and be the first to sell off the shoddy assets.
 
The banks would argue that any kind of leniency or accommodation might lead to moral hazard and set legal precedents. Of course this logic applied when the banks and the entire financial system was at risk due in most part because of overaggressive risk taking by financial institutions.
 
This latest chapter of the housing bubble highlights the importance of market design, a key point that is often unemphasized/overlooked in economic analysis.

 Markets do not exist naturally in nature.  In order for markets to be effective and efficient they must be designed properly. Some markets require more regulation than others. We see this at a micro level with the mortgage market and as well as at a national level with the Eurozone (and someday in the next couple of  years we will see it with China).

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